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TEACHER STRIKES:
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
JANICE K. ROSENBERG*
The alarming frequency of public school teacher strikes suggests
that applicable collective bargaining statutes need significant
changes. Based on the premise that public employees, including
teachers, should not have the right to strike against the government-
employer, these statutes employ various procedures to provide a sub-
stitute for the proscribed strike.' Unfortunately, these laws have not
been effective. The number of public employee strikes,' and teacher
strikes in particular,3 continues to increase. With the start of each
new school year, strikes by public school teachers occur in defiance of
* A.B. Bryn Mawr College, 1976; J.D. Washington University, 1979.
I. Most state public employee labor relations laws focus on the strike proscrip-
tion. Consequently, the statutes provide mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or com-
binations thereof to serve as strike substitutes. See notes 27, 61 and 62 and
accompanying text infra.
2. Among state and local government employees, there were 142 strikes in 1964
involving 105.000 workers and 455,000 man-days idle; in 1968 there were 254 strikes
among 202,000 workers with 2,550,000 man-days idle; in 1970 there were 409 strikes
among 177,600 workers with 1,375,000 man-days idle. In 1975 there were 478 strikes
among 318,500 workers and involving 2,204,400 man-days idle; in 1976 there were
378 stnkes among 130,700 workers with 1,690,700 man-days idle. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES, 1976, 77 (1978);
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS 320-21 (1971) and 310 (1976).
3. Of the 378 government work stoppages in 1976, 138 (approximately 36.5%) in-
volved teachers. The next largest occupational group of public sector strikers was
blue-collar and manual workers; this group struck 60 times in 1976 and comprised
only 15.9% of the total public sector strikes during that year. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES, 1976, 77 (1978).
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the statutory proscription.4 Defects in the public employee labor re-
lations laws appear to be the major source of the numerous illegal
public school teacher strikes.
The problems with the current body of laws governing public em-
ployee labor relations evidence a need for a new legislative approach:
teachers must be granted a qualified right to strike. Collective bar-
gaining between teachers and school boards should be simple and
direct. The public interest-the welfare of school children and the
tranquil and efficient delivery of public services-demands that
teachers legitimately possess the bargaining leverage of a strike. The
circuitous route of existing legislative patterns only delays the inevi-
table strikes and increases the friction between the parties. Without
the legal right to strike, teacher-school board negotiations will suffer
continued frustrations and the public, as well, will suffer as a result.
Teachers are the most militant group in the public sector, as evi-
denced by their striking to achieve their collective bargaining de-
mands.' Although the sources of teacher militancy are varied,'
empirical studies usually attribute this phenomenon to the increas-
ingly younger and more highly educated persons who teach full-
time.7 Further, the peculiar consequences of strikes in the public
4. For example, teachers struck in three major southern Illinois communities prior
to the commencement of classes in the fall of 1978. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Aug.
2, 1978, at IA, col. I.
5. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
6. Certainly the increased militancy among teachers is part of the trend of in-
creased unionization of public and white-collar employees. Although traditionally
difficult to organize, white-collar unions have recently grown in number. For a dis-
cussion of this trend and its peculiar problems, see Anderson, Strikes and Impasse
Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943, 954 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Anderson]; Moskow & McLennan, Teacher Strikes and Dispute Settlement Policj,
14 N.Y. L.F. 281, 281-84 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Moskow & McLennan];
Wildman, Collective Action by Public School Teachers, 18 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3,
8 (1964). This militancy and unionization may also be "a reflection of a more general
tendency in our society to form groups in order to augment the force of individual
demands by concerted action." Kheel, Strikes and Public Emplojrnent, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 931, 931 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kheel].
7. For a review of the major empirical studies concerning the various sources of
teacher militancy as well as an interesting and innovative study of the problem, see
Fox & Wince, The Structure and Determinants of Occupational Militancy Among Pub-
lic School Teachers, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 47 (1976). See general!;' R. SMITH.
H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CASES
AND MATERIALS (1974); Zack, Why Public Employees Strike, 23 ARB. J. 69 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Zack]; Note, 4 Critical Approach to the Traditional Prohibition of
Teacher Strikes in Connecticut: Is the Quaified Right to Strike a Viable Alternative, 2
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school system enhance its attractiveness as a collective bargaining
tool for the employees: "Striking teachers, unlike other employees,
lose no work days as a result of the strike. Schools almost always
remain in session the full 180 days, and teachers are subject to only
the inconvenience resulting from the extension of the school year."'
Thus, of all public employees, teachers merit special attention since
they strike more frequently and suffer less loss than other public em-
ployees. Additionally, teachers illustrate an emerging trend of both
unionization and utilization of the strike weapon by many heretofore
unorganized white collar workers.9
I. STRIKES: HISTORY OF CURRENT LEGISLATION
The growth of public sector collective bargaining spans a relatively
short segment of recent American history.'" Prior to 1946, a noted
absence of such legislation" forced courts to rely upon the common
law which gave teachers and other public employees the right to join
a union, but prohibited them from striking. 2 The period from 1946
CONN. L. REV. 171, 173 and 173 n.13 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Teacher Strikes in
Connecticut]; Comment, The Scope of Bargaining in Public Education Under the Penn-
silrania Public Emploree RelationsAct, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 427, 442 n.62 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Bargaining in Public Education].
8. Note, Impasse Resolution Mechanisms and Teacher Strikes, 7 U. MICH. J. L.
REF. 575, 579 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Impasse Resolution]. See also Alderfer, Fol-
low-Up on the Pennsr'ania Public School Strikes, 25 LAB. L. J. 161 (1974).
9. See note 6 and accompanying text supra, Wollett, The Coming Revolution in
Public School Management, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1017 (1969).
10. See Kerman, Strikes and Work Stoppages in the Public Sector, 43 N.Y.S. B. J.
24, 24-26 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Kerman]; Note, An Analysis of the Comprehensive
Approach to the Public-Employee Strike Problem, 44 Miss. L.J. 766, 766-70 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Comprehensive Approach].
11. The relatively small number of statutes and ordinances concerning public em-
ployee collective bargaining and strikes enacted in the wake of the 1919 Boston police
strike provide the only exceptions to this general observation. Kernan, supra note 10,
at 24.
12. Before 1946, courts relied upon the common law which provided that public
employees could join unions even though the public employer was not obligated to
bargain with these unions. Additionally, the government could restrict the type of
union created. Id. See also United Fed'n of Postal Workers v. Blount, 325 F. Supp.
879, 882 (D.D.C.), a~jd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971) ("At common law no employee, whether
public or private, had a constitutional right to strike in concert with his fellow work-
ers;" such concerted action resulted in common law prosecution of strikes as conspira-
cies); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill.2d 567, 571, 207 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965)("there
is no inherent right in municipal employees to strike against their governmental em-
ployer"); Jefferson County Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627, 628
1979]
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to 1959 witnessed a rapid growth in the rate of government employ-
ment 3 and public employee union organization. 4 In response to
subsequent turmoil in both private and public sector labor rela-
tions, 15 state legislatures enacted strident laws which prohibited pub-
lic employee strikes and exacted heavy penalties for recalcitrant
public sector unions. 6
The 1960's heralded a new approach for dealing with public sector
strikes. Congress introduced a statutory right to bargain collectively
and alternative means for impasse resolution.' 7 A majority of states
(Ct. App. Ky. 1970) ("Under the common law it is recognized that public employees
do not have the right to strike or to engage in concerted work stoppages"); Rockwell
v. Board of Educ. of Crestwood, 57 Mich. App. 636, 642, 226 N.W.2d 596, 598 (1975).
rev'don other grounds, 393 Mich. 616, 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975), cert. granted 427 U.S.
901 (1976) ("it is well settled that there is neither a common law nor a constitutional
right of public employees to strike"); Head v. Special School Dist., 288 Minn. 496.
507, 182 N.W.2d 887, 894 ("it is clearly established at common law that a strike by
public employees for any purpose is illegal").
13. In 1947 there were 3,789,000 employees in state and local government, com-
prising 6.2% of the nation's work force; by 1950 there were 4,285,000 public employ-
ees comprising 6.7% of the total work force; in 1955 the 5,054,000 government
workers comprised 7.4% of the work force; in 1962 there were 6,849,000 public sector
workers comprising 9.3% of the work force. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1977, 96, 21 (1977). The growth
in the number of teachers has been the most significant area of increase among public
employees. On the state and local level, all employment increased 117.0% between
1957 and 1976. During this same period, teacher employment increased 156.4%. Job,
More Public Services Spur Growth in Government Emplqyment, 101(9) MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 3, 3-7 (1978).
14. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. Union membership among gov-
ernment employees grew from 5.1% in 1956 to 5.9% in 1960. In 1964 this group in-
creased to 8.1% and in 1970, 11.2% of government employees belonged to unions.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS 1971, 327-30 (1971).
15. In 1956 there were 27 public employee work stoppages, involving 3,460 work-
ers and 11,100 man-days idle; there were 36 work stoppages in 1960 among 28.600
workers, with 58,400 man-days idle. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1971 at 318-21 (1971). See generally Ker-
man, supra note 10; Comprehensive Approach, supra note 10, at 767-68; Bargaining in
Public Education, supra note 7, at 429-31. See also note 3 and accompanying text
supra.
16. See, e.g., Mo. STAT. ANN. § 105.530 (Vernon 1976).
17. The federal approach is found in Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-
1963 Compilation), which recognized federal employees' right to bargain collectively.
The Order signifies a dramatic development in public sector labor law. "It recognized
the principle that federal employees will be less inclined to strike if they are given a
voice in determining their wages and conditions of employment and thus have viable
alternatives to the strike for resolution of their grievances." Comprehensive Approach,
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then enacted dispute-settlement legislation 8 patterned after the fed-
eral approach. These no-strike laws withstood frequent constitu-
tional challenges. Specifically, state courts upheld these laws when
alleged to violate First Amendment guarantees of freedom of assem-
bly and freedom of speech. 9 Courts also upheld these statutes when
they were claimed to violate the Thirteenth Amendment proscription
of involuntary servitude20 and the Fourteenth Amendment mandate
of equal protection of the laws.2 Although constitutionally valid,
supra note 11, at 769. Additionally, penalties for activities equivalent to any of the
itemized unfair labor practices enforced the strike proscription.
18. Statutes employing the dispute-resolution approach prohibit public employee
strikes, but provide an alternative method for resolving bargaining impasses. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 1310 (1974) (parties may submit impasses in public
employee negotiations to arbitration); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1293 (1971) (if teacher
disputes continue after the parties "meet and confer," parties submit the problem to
non-binding fact-finding). In addition, see Comprehensive Approach, supra note 11, at
768-71 for an overview of responses to this turmoil by Alaska, California, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
19. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed'n. of Teachers, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 444-
5, 264 N.E.2d 18, 21 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971)(First Amendment con-
siderations do not control when an unlawful strike is in progress); Board of Educ. v.
Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 574, 207 N.E,2d 427, 431 (1965) ("[I]t is more than clear that a
state may, without abridging the right of free speech, restrain picketing where such
curtailment is necessary to protect the public interest and property rights and where
the picketing is for a purpose unlawful under state laws or policies."); Jefferson
County Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Ky. App. 1970) ("the
rights of free speech and public assembly do not license violation of law"); School
Dist. for Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n., 380 Mich. 314, 321, 157 N.W.2d 206, 208
(1968) ("within limitations,. . . the sovereignty may deny to its employees the right
to strike"). See also City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, 87 R.I. 364,
141 A.2d 624 (1958) (no-strike laws valid under Rhode Island constitutional guaran-
tees of free speech and freedom of assembly).
20. See, e.g., Pinellas County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n. v. Board of Pub. In-
struction, 214 So. 2d 34, 37 (Fla. 1968) ("We are not here confronted by an arbitrary
mandate to compel performance of personal service against the will of the employee.
These people were simply told that they had contracted with the government and that
[ . . t]hey could not. . . strike against the government and retain the benefits of their
contract positions."); School Dist. for Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n., 380 Mich.
314, 321, 157 N.W.2d 206, 208 (1968) (the sovereign may legitimately prohibit the
right to strike).
21. See, e.g., Norwalk Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 276, 83
A.2d 482, 485 (1951) (Public employees are not denied equal treatment by the strike
proscription: "They occupy a status entirely different from those who carry on a pri-
vate enterprise. They serve the public welfare and not a private purpose"); Jefferson
County Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Ky. 1971) (There is
no denial of equal protection of the law by prohibiting the right to strike only in the
1979]
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these statutory solutions proved ineffective: "the public-sector strike
problem only worsened. The number of work stoppages from 1962,
the year of the enactment of the first dispute settlement program, to
1970, increased from 28 to 412. "22 In the early 1970's, several states
sought to improve the dispute-settlement approach through enact-
ment of comprehensive programs designed to finally resolve the re-
curring strike problem.23 Nonetheless, teacher strikes continually
occur.
2 4
Both the role of the courts and the current economic climate con-
tribute to the continued inefficacy of the various statutory approaches
to public sector collective bargaining.
The courts play a major role in enforcing public employee collec-
tive bargaining statutes; courts also contribute to the frequency of il-
legal teacher strikes. When teachers violate the law by striking,25
public sector because there is a "reasonable basis" in the public-private sector distinc-
tion.); Head v. Special School Dist., 288 Minn. 496, 509, 182 N.W.2d 887, 893, cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1970) (the danger to public safety and welfare justify the public
sector strike proscription); Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 242 N.E.2d 802, 807,
295 N.Y.S.2d 625, 530 (1968) (a legitimate distinction between public and private
employment is constitutionally permissible).
22. Comprehensive Approach, supra note II, at 770. Generally, the problems with
these dispute-resolution approaches to public sector labor relations stem from the fact
that the programs were enacted hastily, without the aid of labor experts and were
administered haphazardly. These programs did not deal with the problem which
caused the strikes, ie., the disparity between public and private employees' wages and
benefits. Furthermore, the procedures provided by this legislation were ineffective.
.d.
23. The comprehensive approach entails successive recourse to mediation, fact-
finding, and arbitration to resolve impasses. Independent agencies or commissions
usually administer these programs. In the majority of states, these three steps are
conclusive. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D (1964 & Supp. 1978);
N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW § 209 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1978-1979); Wis. STAT. ANN.
111.70 (West 1974). Cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 925 (Supp. 1978) (the single package
"last best offer" of the parties through approval by the General Assembly although
the Assembly is not prevented from modifying the agreement). In some jurisdictions,
however, a strike may follow these three steps. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 89-11,
89-12 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1977).
24. See notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text supra.
25. Courts frequently find it difficult to determine when a teacher strike has oc-
curred. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n., 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 867
(1968) (blacklisting of a school district by the National Education Association held to
be a strike). See also School Dist. for Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n., 380 Mich.
314, 327, 157 N.W.2d 206, 211 (1968) (Souris, J., concurring) (because contracts had
not been signed, teachers were not employees within the contemplation of the rele-
vant statute, and no strike occurred).
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enforcement of the statutes' mandate is usually left to the courts.2 6
Because statutory sanctions tend to exacerbate a delicate situation
and are "after-the-fact" in nature, they are generally ineffective.27
Usually, then, the courts must remedy the situation and enforce the
statutory proscription. Courts most often react to public school
teacher strikes by issuing the anti-strike injunction requested by the
school board.2' However, the frequent violation of these court orders
produces problems. Teachers often ignore the injunctions and courts
26. "Most states which prohibit public employee strikes do not provide for auto-
matic sanctions where strikes occur in derogation of such prohibitions." Note, Strik-
ing a Balance in Bargaining with Public School Teachers, 56 IOWA L. REv. 598, 601
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Striking a Balance].
27. For an excellent discussion of the problems with the punitive approach to
illegal teacher strikes, see Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and
the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REv. 260, 269-70 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Prevention of Strikes]. See also City and County of San Fran-
sicso v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 534 P.2d 403, 415, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707, 719 (1975)
("experience has all too frequently demonstrated, however, that such harsh, auto-
matic sanctions do not prevent strikes but instead are counterproductive, exacerbating
employer-employee friction and prolonging work stoppages").
28. Striking a Balance, supra note 26, at 601. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Red-
ding, 32 I11. 2d 567, 576, 207 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965) (court reversed lower court denial
of injunction against striking school custodial employees); Board of Educ. v. New
Jersey Educ. Ass'n., 53 N.J. 29, 38, 247 A.2d 867, 878 (1968) (court upheld ruling
restraining teacher resignation and acts which would prevent other teachers from ac-
cepting jobs); In re Burhrer, 50 N.J. 501, 522, 236 A.2d 592, 603-04 (1967) (court
imposed jail sentences and fines for contempt of court convictions resulting from
teachers' violations of strike injunction); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n.,
Ill R.I. 96, 104, 299 A.2d 441, 446 (1973) (court refused to issue an automatic re-
straining order upon showing of teacher strike and instead ordered a hearing on this
motion: "Ex parte relief in instances such as teacher-school committee disputes can
make the judiciary an unwitting third party at the bargaining table and a potential
coercive force in the collective bargaining processes"); Danville Bd. of School Direc-
tors v. Fifield, 132 Vt. 271, 276, 315 A.2d 473, 474 (1974) (because the school board
failed to arbitrate with teachers according to agreement and filed suit for an injunc-
tion against the arbitration instead, court denied the injunction and required board to
submit to arbitration). Some courts have dealt with temporary injunctions rather than
permanent injunctions. See, e.g., Board of Jr. College Dist. v. Cook County College
Teacher Union, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 435, 262 N.E.2d 125, 129-30 (1st Dist. 1970)
(court rejected school board motion that temporary injunction be lifted and upheld
contempt citation for violation of the temporary injunction); School Dist. for Holland
v. Holland Educ. Ass'n., 380 Mich. 314, 327, 157 N.W.2d 206, 208 (court dissolved
temporary injunction and remanded for a hearing on, inter alia, whether an injunc-
tion should issue). For a general discussion of the injunction and the civil and crimi-
nal contempt citations, see Halligan, Enjoining Public Employees' Strikes- Dealing
with Recalcitrant Defendants, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 298 (1969).
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must issue contempt citations.29
Commentators usually cite the lack of effective statutory sanctions
and the ambivalence of courts in issuing injunctions as the source of
these contempt orders.3' Further, the imposition of fines, jail terms,
and probation as means to enforce the contempt citation can be
counterproductive. More specifically, a "martyr" problem frequently
arises: jailing a union leader may increase the union's militancy and
create embarrassment when continued negotiations necessitate his re-
lease.3 1 Such enforcement measures applied to teachers often pro-
duce sympathy strikes, amnesty strikes, and disguised strikes32 which
could negatively affect the quality of education.33 Clearly, the nu-
merous counterproductive effects of judicial sanctions effectively re-
but the suggestion that courts ought to apply more stringent sanctions
to illegal strikers.
Although the judicial system has been the primary vehicle for en-
forcing the strike proscription, the courts have also been the conduits
for the recent trend in the erosion of the legal sanctions against
strikes. In an increasing number of jurisdictions, a school board's
assertion that the impending or existing strike will harm the public
health, safety, and welfare no longer guarantees the issuance of an
injunction.34 Instead, courts demand that requests for an injunction
29. See, e.g., School Comm. of New Bedford v. Dlouhy, 360 Mass. 109, 115-16,
271 N.E.2d 655, 657-68 (1971) (imposing a fine, this court assessed the total expense to
the city from the strike at $100,000 based upon wages paid to the strike-breakers, costs
of operating buses and utilities, and costs incurred when the lost days were scheduled
later); In re Jersey City Educ. Ass'n., 115 N.J. Super. 42, 57, 278 A.2d 206, 214 (court
emphasized deterrent effect of contempt penalties imposed).
30. See Impasse Resolution, supra, note 8, at 578-79.
31. See Comprehensive Approach, supra note 10, at 773-74.
32. Id. at 774.
33. Id. Relatively little has been written about the effects of strikes on students
and most of the comments have been merely rhetorical. See Radke, Real Signicance
of Collective Bargaining for Teachers, 15 LAB. L.J. 795, 797 (1964); Seitz, Rights of
School Teachers to Engage in Labor Organizational Activities, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 36,
42 (1960).
34. The seminal case in this area is School Dist. for Holland v. Holland Educ.
Ass'n., 380 Mich. 314, 326, N.W.2d 206, 210 (1968), in which the court held that a
showing of a public employee strike does not, ipso facto, justify an injunction since "it
is basically contrary to public policy in this state to issue injunctions, in labor disputes
absent a showing of violence, irreparable injury or breach of the peace." See also
Timberlane Regional School Dist. v. Timberlane Region Educ. Ass'n., 114 N.H. 245,
251, 317 A.2d 555, 559 (1974) (factors determining the issuance of an injunction in-
clude "whether recognized methods of settlement have failed, whether negotiations
have been conducted in good faith, and whether the public health, safety, and welfare
[Vol 16 331
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demonstrate specific and serious harm from the impending or actual
strike. 5 Many courts also apply traditional equity doctrines when
issuing injunctions and require the school board to come to the court
with "clean hands."36 A California court recently took a further step
in the erosion of legal sanctions against strikes when it upheld the
validity of a teacher-school board contract, although the contract was
the product of an illegal, and allegedly coercive, teacher strike.37
Certainly the current economic climate has had an impact upon
the teacher negotiations and the frequency of teacher strikes.38 Infla-
tion and the glutted labor market for teachers has taken its toll on
limited school board appropriations, teacher demands, and the fric-
tion attending negotiations. It appears unlikely that these factors will
be mitigated in the immediate future. In fact, despite the continual
upgrading of public employee labor relations laws,39 the future eco-
will be substantially harmed if the strike is allowed to continue."); School Comm. v.
Westerly Teachers' Ass'n., I11 R.I. 96, 103, 299 A.2d 441, 445 (1973) (the court as-
serted that "the mere failure of a public school system to begin its school year on the
appointed day cannot be classified as a catastrophic event. . . . There is flexibility in
the calendaring of the school year that. . . may also negate the necessity of the im-
mediate injunction which could conceivably subject some individuals to the court's
plenary power of contempt."). Cf. In re Berry, 68 Cal. App. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65
Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968) (injunction declared invalid as overbroad where order prohib-
ited picketing as well as striking); Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n. of Teachers,
1977 Lab. Cas. CCH Par. 55.055 (quashed suit against striking teachers which sought
damages under common law tort remedies).
35. See, e.g., School Dist. for Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n., 380 Mich. 314,
326, 157 N.W.2d 206, 210 (1968) ("it is basically contrary to public policy in this state
to issue injunctions in labor disputes absent a showing of violence, irreparable injury
or breach of the peace"); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n., 96 R.I. 111, 104-
05, 299 A.2d 441, 446 (1973) (court refused to issue a restraining order merely because
the school board alleged a teacher work stoppage, instead the court required a full
hearing on this issue).
36. See Rockwell v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. of Crestwood, 393 Mich. 616,
227 N.W.2d 736 (1975) (court held that striking teachers may not necessarily receive
statutory sanctions if reviewing agency determines that the strike was provoked by
unfair labor practices of the school board); School Dist. for Holland v. Holland Educ.
Ass'n., 380 Mich. 314, 327, 157 N.W.2d 206, 211 (1968) (in remanding to determine
whether an injunction should issue, the court directed a finding of whether "the plain-
tiff school district has refused to bargain in good faith").
37. City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 534 P.2d 403,
120 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975).
38. See Nordlund, .4 Critique of Teacher Negotiations in 1974-1975, 26 LAB. L.J.
119, 119-24 (1975).
39. Several jurisdictions now permit a qualified right to strike. The Alaska stat-
ute, for example, qualifies the right to strike by a classification of employees: 1)
When mediation fails to resolve an impasse involving police, firefighters and jail,
19791
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nomic climate portends continued illegal strike activity, particularly
among teachers.40 Thus, further statutory changes are imperative.
II. STRIKES: PUBLIC SECTOR VS. PRIVATE SECTOR
In the private sector, strikes constitute a necessary element in the
collective bargaining process.41 Both the strike threat and the strike
itself operate to equalize the bargaining positions of the parties.42
The strike weapon supplies the leverage necessary to enable the less
powerful union to demand and receive concessions at the bargaining
table from the more powerful management: it is the factor in em-
ployer-union relations which forces the employer to bargain seriously
with the union.43 However, the strike is not merely a tactic employed
by unions to force compromises from management. "The beauty of
the strike is that while a potent weapon, it also inflicts damage on the
prison and hospital employees, arbitration is the sole recourse; 2) A strike may follow
unsuccessful mediation for public utility, snow removal, sanitation and educational
(including teachers) employees. However, considerations of public health, safety and
welfare and the employees' compliance with statutory requisites may limit the dura-
tion of the strike; 3) All other public workers may strike on an employee vote. ALAS.
STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972). Other jurisdictions permit public employee strikes after ex-
haustion of other impasse resolution devices. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11, 89-
12 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1977) (strikes permitted after failure of
mediation, fact-finding and arbitration); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (1978)
(strikes permitted after breakdown of mediation procedures. See also MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 179.64 (Supp. 1978) (non-essential employee strikes permitted when employer
fails to request binding arbitration or fails to comply with a binding arbitration or-
der).
40. See generally Nordlund, A Critique of Teacher Negotiations in 1974-1975, 26
LAB. L.J. 119 (1975).
41. Basically, there are three types of strikes: 1) recognition strikes to acquire
both the status of bargaining unit for a group of employees and the power to collec-
tively bargain for them; 2) jurisdictional strikes which occur between unions with
respect to work assignments; and 3) strikes during the term of the agreement which
generally concern wages and conditions of employment. Clark, Public Employee
Strikes: Some Proposed Solutions, 23 LAB. L.J. 111, 113-15 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Clark].
42. See generally Anderson, supra note 6; Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in
Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REv. 459, 463-64 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Bernstein]; Bilik, Toward Public Sector Equality Extending the Strike Privilege, 21
LAB. L.J. 338, 344 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bilik]; Clark, supra note 41; Moskow &
McLennan, supra note 6, at 286; Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargain-
ing in Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 822 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Welling-
ton & Winter]; Zack, Note, Binding Arbitration, 10 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 157, 165
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Binding Arbitration].
43. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 462.
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wielder, so that even the threat of its use induces in both sides the
degree of reasonableness essential to realistic bargaining."'  Conse-
quently, unions rarely use their right to strike.45 The strike threat,
rather than the strike itself, is actually the more common and effica-
cious bargaining tactic.46
The justification for the strike proscription in the public sector47
rests primarily on alleged differences in employer-employee relations
in the public and private sectors.48 Historically, the proscription was
based on the premise that the sovereignty of the public sector would
not tolerate strikes.49 Commentators also argue that the profit motive,
44. Id. at 463.
45. Id.
46. Id. See also Binding Arbitration, supra note 42.
47. It is important to note that with respect to the existence of any right to strike,
public employees are coequal with private sector employees: "[i]n the absence of a
statute, they too do not possess the right to strike." United Fed'n. of Postal Workers
v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 882 (D.D.C.), afd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
48. The most common public/private sector distinction alleges that the economic
impact of a private sector strike translates into political pressure in the public sector.
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 41, at 115-16 ("The purpose of a private sector strike is to
bring economic pressure on the employer ... the purpose of a strike in the public
sector is to bring political pressure on the public employer"); Zack, supra note 7, at 76
("Traditional economic power which underlies private industry collective bargaining
cannot be exercised by public employees because there is none of the economic coer-
cion accompanying threats of strike or lockout"); Binding Arbitration, supra note 42,
at 157 ("the effect of the [public sector] strike is to deny the public the performance of
given service. . . to bring pressure to bear on the public employer").
49. Since strikes in the public sector would sanction control of a government func-
tion for private profit, they would be anarchic and would effectively deny the author-
ity of elected officials. Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Public
Inst., 214 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1968). See also Bernstein, supra note 42. A corollary to this
policy argument is the assertion that public employees have a special duty to promote
the efficient operation of the government. See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n. v. Board of
Educ. of City of Norwalk, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951) (public employees as
government agents have a "special duty" and their status is inherently different from
private workers), Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Public In-
str., 214 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1968) (the absence of a right to strike is an incident of public
employment); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 111. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (as
government agents, public employees have a duty not to act in any way which would
harm the efficiency of other public employees); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers
Ass'n., 96 R.I. 111,299 A.2d 441 (1973) (teachers are government agents charged with
aiding the government in its constitutional duty to educate its youth). Cf. School
Dist. for City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W. 2d 206
(1968) (the sovereign possesses the authority to limit the ability of its employees to
strike); In re Bueher, 50 N.J. 501, 236 A.2d 592 (1967) (teachers, as public servants,
must set an example for other citizens by complying with the strike injunction); City
of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958) (pub-
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necessary in the private sector for a strike to exert pressure on the
employer, is absent in the public sector.5 Further, a significant
number of courts and commentators maintain that public services are
essential and that a strike by public employees could cripple the cit-
ies. 5 Finally, many argue that public sector strikes distort the "nor-
mal political process." 52
The expansion of government into areas which traditionally were
lic employment involves the surrender of some personal rights and liberties, including
the right to strike).
50. A private sector strike threatens the economic welfare of management which
cannot withstand a prolonged strike and maintain a profitable business. However,
public sector services are subject to an inelastic demand. Because services cannot be
substituted, a strike cannot put economic pressure on the government. Furthermore,
a private employer has the option of closing down operations entirely in response to a
strike whereas the government cannot go out of business. See Moskow & McLennan,
supra note 6, at 286; Wellington & Winter, supra note 42, at 677.
51. See Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (teach-
ers' strikes cannot obstruct delivery of government services); Pinellas County Class-
room Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Public Instr., 214 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1968) (teacher
strikes are prohibited to prevent the breakdown of an essential aspect of government);
Board of Educ. of Newark v. Newark Teachers Union Local 481, 114 N.J. Super. 306,
276 A.2d 175 (1971) (public interest demands freedom from interruption of the educa-
tion of youth); Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n., 53 N.J. 29,
247 A.2d 867 (1968) (teachers do not have the right to make government agencies
unable to function by virtue of a strike); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n.,
96 R.I. I 11, 299 A.2d 441 (1973) (the need to prevent government paralysis justifies
the teacher strike prohibition); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87
R.I. 364, 372, 141 A.2d 624, 629 (1958) (the functions of government in a democracy
cannot be impeded or obstructed by strikes). Denial of government services would
also harm the public health, safety and welfare and would punish the innocent public.
Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951) (al-
lowing strikes would permit teachers to contravene the public welfare). Head v. Spe-
cial School Dist. No. 1, 288 Minn. 496, 182 N.W.2d 887, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886
(1970) (the rationale of the no-strike law is to prevent danger to public safety and
welfare from teachers' strikes). See generally Binding Arbitration, supra note 42.
52. This theory stresses that striking employees could command an increased pro-
portion of the budget without a public directive as to the appropriateness of that par-
ticular allocation of resources. For a detailed discussion of the role of public sector
strikes as distorting the political process, see Wellington & Winter, supra note 42, at
677. The asserted disruption of the political process by public employee strikes is
based upon several distinctions between the public and private sectors: 1) decisions
are made by top officials in the private sector and diffused among many public agen-
cies; 2) public conditions of employment are pre-mandated by law whereas they are
developed by joint effort in the private sector; 3) taxes finance the costs of public
sector strike settlement while private settlement costs are passed on to the consumer.
and 4) the negotiating public employer is generally without control of available funds
while private management negotiators directly control the funds for their employees.
Binding Arbftration, supra note 42, at 160-63.
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solely within the ambit of the private sector reveals a major weakness
in the basis of these arguments. Conditions in modern society no
longer justify the historical private/public sector distinction. 3 In-
deed, numerous lawsuits have sought to challenge this distinction.
For example, although modern courts continue to assert the sover-
eignty argument, this theory seems to be mere question-begging and
conclusory upon closer examination. 54 The essential services and
profit motive arguments are also subject to criticism as being based
upon a non-existent economic model of perfect competition." Fi-
nally, the public's concern over additional tax increases supplies a
natural limit to the demands of public sector unions, so that it is un-
likely that public sector strikes would distort the political process.
56
In fact, it is questionable whether a "normal political process" actu-
ally exists.57
Arguments that public sector strikes operate differently from those
in the private sector are repeated strenuously and often. The recent
strikes by numerous public workers which momentarily crippled
53. See Edwards, The De;,eloping Labor-Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10
DUQ. L. REV. 357, 359-61 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Edwards].
54. The courts often rely on flowery language aimed at the readers' emotions
rather than relying on logic. For example, the court in School Comm. v. Westerly
Teachers Ass'n., 111 R.I. 96, 100, 299 A.2d 441, 443-44 (1973) declared:
The state has a compelling interest that one of its most precious assets-its
youth-have the opportunity to drink at the font of knowledge so that they may
be nurtured and develop into the responsible citizens of tomorrow. No one has
the right to turn off the fountain's spigot and keep it in a closed position.
See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n. v. Board of Education of City of Norwalk, 138 Conn.
269, 273, 83 A.2d 482, 484 (1951) (the court set the stage for its conclusions against the
teacher strike by asserting that "Under our system, the government is established by
and run for all of the people, not for the benefit of any person or group"); Pinella's
County Classroom Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Public Instruction, 214 S.2d 34, 36
(Fla. 1968) (the court describes a teacher strike as producing "the breakdown" of this
aspect of government); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 IUI. 2d 567, 573, 207 N.E.2d
427, 432 (1965) (the court described the teachers' strike as "impeding and obstructing"
this service).
55. See, e.g., Edwards, s5upra note 53, at 362.
56. See Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes b, Public Employ-
ees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 424-32 (1970); Edwards, supra note 53, at 363.
57. Burton, Can Public Employees be Given the Right to Strike? 21 LAB. L.J. 472
(1970). This study also notes various means-other than the strike-by which unions
gain influence. Similar to the strike, these tactics generally operate outside the "nor-
mal political process." These tactics include dissemination of information, direct ac-
tion short of strikes, legal action, independent political actions, conjunctive political
action, patronage, and third-party intervention (mediation or fact-finding).
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New York City58 illustrates the oft-repeated arguments that public
services are essential and that the sovereignty will not tolerate strikes.
However, the effects of the 1977 coal miners strike underscore the
fallacy of the public/private sector distinction: the havoc produced
by strikes is similar whether triggered by a private or public sector
union.59
III. STRIKE: CURRENT LEGISLATION
Public employees and commentators continually challenge the ne-
cessity and value of the strike proscription. In addition, the incidence
of illegal teacher strikes continues to be high and the largely ineffec-
tive legal sanctions against these strikes rapidly erode. Nevertheless,
the strike proscription continues to be an essential element in most
state public employee labor relations laws.6" These laws provide var-
ious types and combinations of impasse resolution techniques
designed to operate as strike substitutes. The techniques usually con-
tained in these statutes include mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or
a combination of these tailored to the needs of each jurisdiction. Re-
gardless of jurisdictional variations, however, the general purpose be-
hind all public employee impasse resolution mechanisms is to
provide an adequate substitute for the strike and to ensure equal bar-
gaining power between the parties.6 '
58. See, e.g., Howlett, The Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 53 CHI. B. REC.
108, 110 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Howlett].
59. See A Coal Emergency, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1978, at 18. See generalr
School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n., 11 R.I. 96, 110, 299 A.2d 441,448 (Rob-
erts, C.J., dissenting) ("The fact is that in many instances strikes by private employees
pose the far more serious threat to the public interest than would many of those en-
gaged in by public employees."); Howlett, supra note 58, at 110 ("[a] strike by either
jolts the public in the same manner.").
60. The strike is prohibited in all but five states. See note 39 supra and accompa-
nying text. Further, some states do not even grant teachers the right of collective
bargaining, let alone the right to strike. For example, in Missouri, a bill which would
have permitted public employee collective bargaining was recently defeated in the
legislature. This legislation was proposed while St. Louis, Missouri public school
teachers were on strike. The President of the Missouri Federation of Teachers noted
that this strike "provided both an excuse for rejecting the bargaining bill and a perfect
example of why it is needed." St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Feb. 19, 1979, at 16A, col.
2.
61. Hildebrand, The Resolution of Impasses, in THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB
AND THE COURTS 289-92 (D. Jones ed. 1967); Note, California Assembl' Adsorr
Council's Recommendations on Impasse Resolution Procedures and Public Employee
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A. Mediation
Mediation is the most popular statutory form of impasse resolu-
tion.b2 It is a simple process which involves the intervention of a
third party in negotiation sessions, to aid settlement of the dispute.63
Frequently employed in teacher-school board disputes,6 4 mediation
is strikingly similar to the collective bargaining process itself. In fact,
commentators often describe the technique as a mere aid to negotia-
tions rather than as a separate mechanism employed when negotia-
tions fail.65 Since mediation encourages a voluntary settlement
between the disputants through the use of a neutral third party,66 the
mediator plays a crucial role because his or her skill becomes the
determinative factor in the success of this mechanism. 67
Statistics suggest that mediation is highly effective in resolving
teacher negotiations.68 Yet, frequently in teacher-school board dis-
putes, mediation appears to be either an additional ground for dis-
pute6 or merely a mandatory stepping-stone on the path toward a
strike." Because the efficacy of mediation in the public sector de-
pends upon the parties' recognition of an attractive dispute-resolution
Strikes, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 473, 486 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Public Employee
Strikes].
62. Public Emplo'ee Strikes, supra note 61 at 885.
63. Clark, supra note 41, at 117-18.
64. See, e.g., Public Employee Strikes, supra note 6 1, at 485. See generally notes
69-70 and accompanying text infra.
65, See Clark, supra note 41, at 118; Report and Recommendations of the Twen-
tieth Century Fund Task Force on Labor Disputes in Public Employment, Pickets at
City Hall, 21-24 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Pickets at City Hal4; Simkin, Mediation
and the Dynamics of Collective Bargaining, in R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK,
LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CASES AND MATERIALS (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Simkin]; Zack, Improving Mediation and Fact-Finding in the Pub-
lic Sector, 21 LAB. L.J. 259, 263-64 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Improving Mediation].
66. Clark, supra note 41, at 117-18.
67. Id.
68. See Krinsky, Avoiding Public Employee Strikes-Lessons/from Recent Strike
,4ctivit;, 21 LAB. L.J. 464, 465 n.6 [hereinafter cited as Krinsky].
69. For example, in Timberlane Regional School District v. Timberlane Regional
Educ. Ass'n., 114 N.H. 245, 317 A.2d 555 (1974), the teachers requested a federal
mediation service mediator for when negotiations reached an impasse. However, this
offer itself produced an impasse: the parties were unable to select a mutually agreea-
ble mediator and finally resumed direct negotiations. When negotiations again broke
down, the teachers struck. This strike was expressly conditioned upon commence-
ment of mediation.
70. In the recent strike by Tucson, Arizona teachers, the flitting use of mediation
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mechanism, this technique has not been very succesful in teacher-
school board negotiations. Instead of seriously attempting to resolve
the dispute at the mediation stage, these parties tend to endure the
mediation process in order to qualify for fact-finding.7
B. Fact-Finding
Unfortunately, the prospect of fact-finding often tolls the death
knell for mediation.72 The appointment of a fact-finder to preside at
an informal hearing where each party presents its version of the dis-
pute begins the process.7 3 The value of fact-finding lies in its presen-
tation of "carefully framed issues, closely related to the prior
bargaining of the parties."7 4 At the conclusion of the hearing, the
fact-finder prepares a report which the parties are free to accept or
reject.
A frequently-debated issue with respect to this mechanism focuses
on whether the fact-finder should initially issue the report only to the
negotiating parties or to the public as well.7 5 If the fact-finder issues
the report to the parties only, they would have an opportunity to alter
some of its terms and to reach an agreement based upon the report as
well as tailored to their needs. Also, the parties could reject the rec-
ommendations. If the fact-finder issues the report publicly from the
outset, however, public pressure may compel its acceptance. Alterna-
tively, the threat of public pressure may provide sufficient impetus for
the parties to reach a negotiated settlement independently of the fact-
finding process.
In constructing the report, the fact-finder's criteria include stand-
ards of equity and the acceptability of the recommendations. In ad-
appeared to be only a momentary diversion in reaching the eventual strike. See. e.g.,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 2, 1978, at 8A, col. 1.
71. Improving Mediation, supra note 65, at 270.
72. See generally Doering, Impasse Issues in Teacher Disputes Submitted to Fact-
Finding in New York, 27 ARB. J. 1, 12-16 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Doering] for a
description of state variations in fact-finding procedures. See also Pickets at City
Hall, supra note 65; Simkin, supra note 65.
73. Anderson, supra note 6, at 967.
74. See Gould, Public Employment. Mediation, Fact-Finding and Arbitration, 55
A.B.A.J. 835, 837-39 (1969); Krinsky, supra note 68, at 468-69.
75. These and other considerations are discussed in R. POGREBIN, New Trends in
Public Employee Organizing and Bargaining (1976); Doering, supra note 72; Public
Employee Strikes, supra note 61, at 485 n.54.
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dition, the fact-finder may incorporate specific statutory criteria. 76
Basically, the weight given to these criteria turns on the fact-finder's
perception of his or her role. The fact-finder must decide whether to
construct proposals which would produce a settlement or to act as a
neutral intervenor who publishes the facts of the dispute and pro-
poses equitable solutions.7 7 In practice, the parties' attitude and pub-
lic reaction to the particular bargaining situation define the fact-
finder's role.
Statistics indicate the utility of fact-finding in resolving public sec-
tor labor disputes;78 the success rate is particularly evident in teacher-
school board negotiations.79 For example, a study of the Wisconin
experience with fact-finding in teacher disputes8 ° concluded that the
low rate of teacher strikes and the high rate of party acceptance of the
fact-finder's award demonstrated that this impasse resolution mecha-
nism was highly regarded by both parties. However, later evalua-
tions in Wisconsin revealed a reversal in this trend: the number of
fact-finding petitions decreased and the frequency of strikes in-
creased. Although teachers were the principal initiators of fact-find-
ing, they were not hesitant to strike when the recommendations were
not favorable. The Wisconsin study attributed this declining success
rate to inherent weaknesses of the fact-finding process. As a dispute-
resolution technique, fact-finding lacks finality and consequently dis-
putants view it as merely an additional step in the bargaining proc-
ess.
81
76. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 925(f) (1978), which directs the fact-finding
panel to consider the following factors in making its recommendation: (1) prevailing
wages and employee benefits for comparable work; (2) work schedules "as they relate
to the employee's needs and the general public's requirement for continual service,"
and (3) "general working conditions as they compare with" prevailing safety stand-
ards and conditions.
77. See Doering, supra note 72; McKelvey, Fact-Finding in Public Employment
Disputes.- Promise or Illusion?, 22 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 528 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as McKelvey].
78. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 967-68; Krinsky, supra note 68, at 465 n.6.
79. See Gatewood, Fact-Finding in Teacher Disputes: The Wisconsin Experience,
97 (10) MONTHLY LAB. REV. 47 (1974); McKelvey, supra note 77. But see Dispute
Settlement in the Public Sector: The State-of-the-Art, Report submitted to the U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Div. of Public Employee Lab. Rel. (1971), which presents data sug-
gesting that fact-finding continues to be efficacious in the private sector.
80. Gatewood, Fact-Finding in Teacher Disputes: The Wisconsin Experience, 97
(10) MONTHLY LAB. REV. 47 (1974).
81. A party may simply decide to strike regardless of the success of fact-finding.
For example, in In re Jersey City Educ. Assn., 115 N.J. Super. 42, 278 A.2d 206
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Theoretically, fact-finding has several characteristics which could
be highly advantageous in resolving bargaining impasses for teach-
ers, and the public sector in general. Compared to mediation, fact-
finding mandates a slightly greater degree of finality and aids negoti-
ations by eliminating any factual disputes. Further, public publica-
tion of the report exerts pressure on the parties to settle.82 This trait
appears to be particularly relevant to teacher-school board disputes
where public accountability weighs heavily with both parties. Al-
though rejection of the recommendation may preclude an agreement.
mutual selection of the fact-finder and restriction of the initial publi-
cation of the report to the parties can substantially eliminate this
problem.83
Another suggestion to increase the efficacy of fact-finding as a
strike substitute is to require binding recommendations. Strikes fre-
quently follow the rejection of fact-finder's recommendations: many
of these strikes would be prevented if the recommendations were
made binding unless the impasse was resolved at that stage in the
negotiations.8 4 Indeed, Nevada8 5 and Vermont86 have implemented
this approach. However, several commentators criticize this ap-
proach as effectively equivalent to binding arbitration,87 although it
is presented in the guise of the less controversial approach of fact-
finding.
(1971), the parties successively employed mediation and fact-finding when negotia-
tions reached an impasse. In the early stages of fact-finding, the teachers met and
voted to strike.
82. Anderson, supra note 6, at 967-68; Bok & Dunlop, Survey of Impasse Proce-
dures andtheir Rationale, in R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS
LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CASES AND MATERIALS (1974).
83. Krinsky, supra note 68, at 468-69.
84. Id. at 470.
85. This approach has been moderately successful. See Grodin, Arbitration of
Public Sector Labor Disputes.- The Nevada Experiment, 28 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv.
89 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Grodin].
86. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 925(i).
87. Fact-finding and arbitration are clearly distinguishable procedures. In fact-
finding, a continuous possibility of voluntary settlement exists and the measure of
success is the acceptability of the recommendations. By contrast, the equity of the
claims determines the success of arbitration. Nonetheless, the two procedures often
overlap with respect to the type of investigation, the scope of the parties' stipulation.
and some of the criteria used. Anderson, supra note 6, at 966.
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C. Arbitration
In contrast to mediation and fact-finding, arbitration"8 involves a
hearing before a specially selected board. At this hearing, each party
summarizes its position on the issues, presents supporting evidence,
and submits briefs to the arbitrator. The arbitrator then produces an
award supported by a written opinion. Depending on the operative
statute, the arbitrator's award may or may not bind the parties. If the
award binds the parties, arbitration settles the collective bargaining
dispute."9 In addition to the issue of whether the arbitrator's award
will be binding, state statutes vary as to which group of public em-
ployees may invoke the procedure, the timing of the award, the com-
position of the panel, and the terms and limitations of the award. 90
Considered to be an effective strike substitute in the public sector,9 1
"arbitration zeroes in on the causes of the impasse, seeking to dis-
solve it before it ripens into a strike. Because most public work stop-
pages involve quarrels over contract provisions during negotiations,
. ..arbitration is a suitable means of preventing public sector work
stoppages."9 2 Although arbitration is relatively new to the public
88. For a concise description of what actually occurs during arbitration, see Ger-
shenfield, Compulsort, Arbitration is Ready, when You Are, 23 LAB. L.J. 153, 156-58
(1972), Gould, The Arbitration Process in the U.S., 28 ARB. J. 111, 114-15 (1973);
Comprehensive Approach. supra note 10. There are two basic kinds of arbitra-
tion-interest arbitration and grievance arbitration. Interest arbitration concerns im-
passes in producing a collective bargaining agreement and is the subject of this Note.
Grievance arbitration is primarily a means to resolve disputes arising from the collec-
tively bargained-for agreement. See Gould, Substitutes for the Strike Weapon: The
Arbitration Process in the U.S., 28 ARB. J. 11, 112-13 (1973).
89. When the arbitrator's decision does not bind the parties, this procedure fails to
resolve the impasse. Arbitration then becomes another step to be taken before a
union exhausts all available alternatives and may strike. A teacher strike following
the school board's rejection of the arbitrator's decision in School Comm. v. Westerly
Teachers Ass'n., 111 R.I. 96, 299 A.2d 441 (1973), illustrates this problem with non-
binding arbitration.
90. For a thorough examination of the variations among state statutes, see
McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms.- A New Approach to the Resolution of
Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
McAvoy].
91. See Anderson, Compulsory Arbitration in Public Sector Dispute Settlement, in
R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SEC-
TOR: CASES AND MATERIALS (1974); Horton, Arbitration, Arbitrators and the Public
Interest, 28 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 497 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Horton]; Wel-
lington & Winter, The Unions and the Cities, in R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK,
LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CASES AND MATERIALS (1974).
02. Comprehensive Approach, supra note 10, at 780 (1973).
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sector, the use of this mechanism has increased substantially.93 In
fact, a trend toward more frequent use of arbitration (particularly
compulsory arbitration) in the public sector has appeared.94 Propo-
nents of the continued expansion of this technique in the public sec-
tor cite its deterrent effect on strikes as its major attribute." As a
result of arbitration's efficacy as a strike substitute and its accommo-
dation of the political and economic needs of the public sector, the
increased use of this impasse resolution technique is likely to con-
tinue.96
Arbitration in the public sector usually takes the form of "last final
offer arbitration," by "issue" rather than by "total package." 97 As its
name implies, last final offer arbitration requires each side to submit
its final offer-either in toto or by each distinct issue-to the arbitra-
tor who then chooses the most reasonable proposition.98 Commenta-
tors have suggested that last final offer arbitration is particularly well-
suited to meet the demands of teacher-school board negotiations,
which include "the teachers' individuality, their inexperience in col-
lective bargaining, their militancy and adamance, and the many pol-
icy considerations, such as class size, which retard the progress of
negotiations each year."99
Despite the fact that last final offer arbitration addresses some of
93. See Boyd, Arbitration vs. Bargaining, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 3, 1978,
§ 1-1 of (News Analysis) at I, col. 1. This article describes the increased use of arbi-
tration in both public and private sector labor disputes. The author focuses on
changes in union and management attitude toward this device and analyzes the theo-
ries behind the pros and cons of arbitration.
94. Id.
95. Proponents of the use of arbitration in public sector disputes include the lead-
ers of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME). The leadership of AFSCME supports the use of arbitration in contract
disputes for public employees working in emergency-care situations. Id.
96. For such predictions, see Horton, supra note 91, at 497-98; Boyd, Arbitration
vs. Bargaining, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 3, 1978, § 1-1 of (News Analysis) at 1,
col. I.
97. Last final offer arbitration by issue permits the arbitrator to choose the most
reasonable of each of the separate issues which comprise the final award. This
method is more flexible than total package last final offer arbitration where the award
may contain some unreasonable issues. Clark, supra note 29, at 119; Garber, Compul-
sory Arbitration in the Public Sector. A Proposed Alternative, 26 ARB. J. 226, 232
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Garber]; Impasse Resolution, supra note 8, at 592-93.
98. Clark, supra note 41, at 119; Garber, supra note 97, at 232; Impasse Resolu-
tion, supra note 8, at 592-93.
99. Impasse Resolution, supra note 8, at 592-93.
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the factors peculiar to teacher-school board impasses, this technique
has generally been challenged on the same grounds as arbitration.
Since arbitration transfers much of the decision-making authority
from the parties to the neutral arbitrator, arbitration is often chal-
lenged and struck down as an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive policy and budgetary determinations.'" ° However, the inclusion
of statutory criteria' °' for the arbitrator and the increased acceptance
of arbitration among modern courts 0 2 may sap the strength of this
100. "[Tjhe employer-employee relationship in government is a legislative matter
which may not be delegated. Such contracts if permitted to stand would result in
taking away from a municipality its legislative power to control its employees and
vest its control in an unrelated and uncontrolled private organization (a union)."
Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 305, 377 P.2d 547, 550 (1962). See also Board
of Educ. v. Rockford Educ. Ass'n., 3 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1093, 280 N.E.2d 286, 287 (2d
Dist. 1972) ("a board of education does not require legislative authority to enter into a
collective bargaining agreement. . . . However, a board may not, through a collective
bargaining agreement or otherwise, delegate to another party those matters of discre-
tion which are vested in the board by statute"); St. Paul Professional Employees
Ass'n. v. City of St. Paul, 303 Minn. 106, 109, 226 N.W.2d 311, 313 (1975) (because
defendant city refused to proceed to arbitration pursuant to state statutory provisions
and union request, court found that city committed an unfair labor practice and af-
firmed the order requiring statutory compliance); State ex rel. Everett Fire Fighters
Local v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 2d 114, 121, 278 P.2d 662, 666 (1955) (court held that
arbitration would be an "abdication" of official responsibility since "the council
would be stepping out of the picture entirely and the arbitration board would be
performing a function which, by law, is the responsibility of the council."). Seegener-
all, McAvoy, supra note 90.
101. Dearborn Firefighters Union Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 42 Mich. App.
51, 56, 201 N.W.2d 650, 652 (1972) (in upholding the constitutionality of the Michi-
gan public sector labor relations statute, the court ruled that the statutory standards
were sufficient to limit the arbitrator's authority); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regu-
lar Firemen's Ass'n., 106 R.I. 109, 117-18, 256 A.2d 206, 211 (1969), in which the
court upheld the arbitrator's standards in the Rhode Island Firefighters' Arbitration
Act as sufficiently specific to sustain the statute's constitutionality. The standard in-
volved a comparison of wage, hours, and employment conditions with several local
trades and with firefighters of comparable cities. Additionally, the arbitration must
balance the public welfare against job hazards and requisite training.
102. For example, the court in Danville Bd. of School Directors v. Fifield, 132 Vt.
271, 275, 315 A.2d 473, 475 (1974), stated that "[airbitration as a way of settling
claims against municipalities has long been recognized by this court." The court then
proceeded to note "the trend on both judicial and legislative action to employ arbitra-
tion as an inexpensive and reasonably amicable method of conflict resolution." Id.
See State ex rel. Firefighters v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 304 (Wyo. 1968)
(court upheld Wyoming statute which required arbitration of firefighter labor dis-
putes); Local 1226 Rhinelander City Employees v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d
209, 215, 151 N.W.2d 30, 33-34 (1967) (court upheld arbitration clause in collective
bargaining agreement for city water department).
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argument.
In addition to the delegation arguments, parties also pose chal-
lenges to arbitration based upon general Due Process principles.10 3
Still others criticize arbitration as discouraging responsible and seri-
ous collective bargaining." However, commentators and statistical
indicators"0 5 seriously challenge each of these arguments because ar-
bitration is effective in resolving public sector labor disputes. Al-
though disputants may regard arbitration as a less desirable means of
resolving public sector (and particularly teacher) labor disputes than
mediation or fact-finding, its use is increasing.' 0 6
Public sector labor relations statutes usually include arbitration as
the final step in a series of procedures which parties may invoke to
resolve disputes without resort to the strike. Most state statutes im-
plement the "arsenal of weapons" approach to public sector dispute
resolution which includes mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration. 1
07
However, the continually high incidence of public sector strikes has
subjected this approach to criticism as ineffective. One commentator
identifies "poor timing, inadequate staffing, haphazard application,
and the absence of a comprehensive and integrated approach to the
settlement of labor disputes"'0 8 as the source of the inadequacy of
these statutory programs.
D. The Comprehensive Approach
A small number of jurisdictions have already incorporated a pro-
posed improvement to the current approach into their statutes.'09
This proposal calls for the implementation of a comprehensive pro-
gram which would include the typical impasse resolution devices,
sanctions to ensure their proper use, and a separate agency to admin-
ister the program. Such an approach offers several advantages. The-
103. See generally McAvoy, supra note 90.
104. See, e.g., Garber, supra note 97; McAvoy, supra note 90; Prevention of
Strikes, supra note 27.
105. See, e.g., Gould, Public Employment: Mediation, Fact-Finding and.4rbitra.
tion, 55 A.B.A.J. 835 (1969); Grodin, supra note 85.
106. See Boyd, 4rbitration vs. Bargaining, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 3, 1978.
§ 1-1 of (News Aanlysis) at 1, col. 1.
107. See generally Prevention of Strikes, supra note 49; Comprehensive Approach,
supra note 10.
108. Prevention of Strikes, supra note 27, at 289.
109. See Comprehensive 4pproach, supra note 10, at 786.
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oretically, this program would address itself to the problems of public
sector labor relations in general as well as to the problems of each
particular jurisdiction. Since it would enforce a unified and compre-
hensive labor policy at each step in the collective bargaining process,
the program would also promote effective resolution of those dis-
putes. There are several problems with this proposal, however. Each
state legislature must resolve questions of funding, determine how
extensive the act will be, and convince the public of the desirability of
an additional layer of bureaucracy prior to successful implementa-
tion of a comprehensive program.
The integrated, watchdog nature of the comprehensive approach to
public sector labor relations represents an attempt to resolve disputes
without resort to strikes. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this
approach can successfully achieve its goal. The comprehensive ap-
proach relies on the same techniques of mediation, fact-finding, and
arbitration which have already proven to be inadequate strike reme-
dies. It is not clear how or why the addition of a comprehensive en-
forcement agency will remedy the defects of the usual impasse
resolution devices and produce equitable collective bargaining agree-
ments without the right to strike. This approach fails to resolve the
basic flaw in the methods currently employed: the absence of the
strike weapon as a bargaining tool in mediation, fact-finding, and ar-
bitration shifts the weight of the bargaining positions to favor the
employer. The comprehensive approach merely changes the avail-
able methods of settling disputes but does not attack the source of the
problem.
IV. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
Fundamental to collective bargaining, the right to strike is as vital
to public sector unions as it is to unions in the private sector. In
particular, public school teachers need the leverage of the right to
strike to effectively bargain with the school boards. A credible strike
threat equalizes the parties' bargaining positions so that collective
bargaining, as the bilateral determination of an agreement, can oper-
ate effectively. Without the right to strike to back up their demands,
teachers and other public employees will continue to be at a disad-
vantage in negotiations." I In fact, in the public sector, "the denial of
the right to strike has the effect of heavily weighing the collectively
110. In addition, agreements reached during an illegal strike often are not binding
if later challenged by the school board. However, the California Supreme Court re-
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bargaining process in favor of the government.""' Under no-strike
laws, "public employees are merely able to make suggestions and rec-
ommendations which the employer will be free to reject without fear
of reprisal."" ' 2 Denying public employees the right to strike nullifies
the right to bargain collectively.
Without the right to strike, the likelihood of impasses in negotia-
tions increases. The basic power positions of the parties determines
the incidence of strikes during collective bargaining sessions." 3
Some commentators argue that the right to strike deters the occur-
rence of strikes by equalizing the parties' bargaining positions: when
the parties are equal, recognition of union demands does not necessi-
tate a strike.
When the union is secure and legally protected in its right to strike,
the employer-aware of his own power to influence the strike deci-
sion-can be expected to exercise great sensitivity toward the bar-
gaining process. "[N]o-strike laws, on the other hand, tend to make
the employer dull to the danger signals, thus enhancing the likeli-
hood of a bargaining breakdown.""' 4
Similarly, in teacher-school board negotiations, the absence of a
right to strike distorts the bargaining process. Because of an inherent
bargaining advantage, the school boards do not always consider
teachers' demands seriously. Consequently, school boards presume
that they can prevent recognition of teacher demands by invoking the
no-strike law.
Teachers, however, possess an advantage over other public em-
ployees when they illegally assume the right to strike: teachers incur
no economic hardship because state statutes require them to satisfy a
minimum number of work days. At the end of an illegal strike,
school districts extend the school year into the summer. As a result,
the public-not the teachers-is most susceptible to the disruptive ef-
fects of the strike. Thus, unlike other public employees, teachers are
especially likely to assert a right to strike. This peculiar feature of
cently upheld a contract negotiated under strike conditions. City and County of San
Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 534 P.2d 403, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975).
111. Timberlane Regional School Dist. v. Timberlane Regional Educ. Ass'n., 114
N.H. 245, 249, 317 A.2d 555, 557 (1974).
112. Moskow & McLennan, supra note 6, at 287.
113. See Bers, The Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 21 LAB. L.J. 482, 482-83
(1970).
114. Bilik, supra note 42, at 347.
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teacher strikes emphasizes the need for a legitimate strike right to
equalize bargaining positions before the parties reach an impasse.
The effective and circuitous routes of the various impasse resolution
techniques cannot prevent strikes and promote negotiated agree-
ments as effectively as the simple device of granting teachers a right
to strike.
A. A Qualied Right to Strike
A statutory qualified right to strike exists in five states for certain
classes of public employees including teachers." 5 Numerous com-
mentators have also proposed a right to strike for public employ-
ees."I6 Most of the right to strike advocates recommend a qualified
right to strike rather than an absolute option. These proposals pres-
ent various formulas. The most common suggestion employs a func-
tional approach to the public employee strike right in which the
availability of the right to strike for public employee groups depends
upon the function of the particular workers. This proposal usually
involves differentiation based on "essential" and "non-essential" em-
ployees."17 The obvious problem with such an approach is the diffi-
culty of distinguishing essential from non-essential government
services.' When examined from the viewpoint of the working par-
ent relying on the caretaking function of schools, uninterrupted deliv-
ery of education could be deemed essential. It is questionable
whether such a standard provides a fair method for determining
wages and labor conditions.' In fact, "this distinction puts a pre-
mium upon an employee group's capacity to injure the public."' 0
Most importantly, it would be politically impossible to implement
this standard.l'
A second criteria for permitting a qualified right to strike employs
115. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
116. Bilik, supra note 42, at 116. See, e.g., Kheel, supra note 6, at 941; Zack,
supra note 7, at 82.
117. See Teacher Strikes in Connecticut, supra note 7, at 184-85; Prevention of
Strikes, supra note 27, at 271.
118. Anderson, supra note 6, at 951; Moskow & McLennan, supra note 6. at 293.
119. Anderson, supra note 6, at 951.
120. Id. at 952.
121. Several commentators emphasize this problem. See, e.g., Anderson, supra
note 6, at 952; Moskow & McLennan, supra note 7, at 293.
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a governmental-proprietary distinction.122 This proposal would deny
the right to strike to those public employees in jobs which serve a
purely governmental function, while permitting strikes for those
workers employed in purely proprietary services. The ambiguity in-
herent in such a standard is evident from the school system which is
both privately and publicly operated. In addition, similar to the
problems with the essential/non-essential standard, both the equity
of this standard and the feasibility of implementing it are open to
serious question.
Another standard for allowing a limited right to strike involves the
notion of the public welfare.' 23 This proposal would permit public
sector strikes unless or until the government-employer demonstrates
that the strike threatens the public health, safety, or welfare. 24 This
approach would define "public welfare" as property loss, the threat
of violence, physical injury to the public, and threat to the life and
health of the public.125 When implemented, this standard would per-
mit an extended teacher strike. Yet, as with the other proposals, the
vagueness of this standard appears to undermine its efficacy.
B. A Proposal
Relatively few commentators have urged an absolute right to strike
for public sector employees 26 despite the fact that the quest for true
collective bargaining and general principles of equity would seem to
mandate such an approach. The absolute strike right does not seem
to be a politically feasible solution. Instead, a limited right to strike
seems to be the best alternative.
122. This distinction is discussed in Teacher Strikes in Connecticut, supra note 7,
at 181-82.
123. Several commentators have presented this proposal. See, e.g., Kerman,
supra note 10, at 42-43; Kheel, supra note 6, at 940-41; Striking a Balance, suvlra note
26.
124. This standard is incorporated into the Pennsylvania public employee labor
relations statute. Pursuant to this law, after exhausting negotiation and mediation
procedures, teachers may strike "unless or until such a strike creates a clear and pres-
ent danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public." PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 1101.1003 (1970) (Purdon).
125. See Kerman, supra note 10, at 42-43.
126. Two noted commentators propose an absolute right to strike. See Anderson,
supra note 7, at 951-52 (a qualified strike right creates more problems than it solves);
Bilik, supra note 30, at 356 ("the unrestricted right to strike is a more reliable deter-
rent to irresponsible action than is the restrictive statute . . . internal restraints are
more compelling").
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The most persuasive approach to the development of a limited
public sector right to strike involves the utilization of the "non-stop-
page" and "graduated" strike.
127
In a non-stoppage strike, operations continue as usual. However,
both the union and the employer make payments into a special pen-
alty fund created from contributions based upon a specified percent-
age of total cash wages. The fund would then be beyond recapture
by either party. Thus, while both parties would be under pressure to
settle, there would be no disruption of service. 28 Students could
complete their education without interruption and parents could
maintain job and vacation schedules without disruption. Pursuant to
this proposal, a union would have the option to initiate the mecha-
nism and thereby increase union bargaining power by applying
steady and potentially increasing pressure upon the government to
settle while giving the government adequate time to adjust to a pro-
posed settlement. This pressure, while effective, would then stop
short of public crisis.' 29
A non-stoppage strike would serve the needs of both the teachers
and the school board. Teachers would obtain the required bargain-
ing leverage and school boards would be able to maintain delivery of
their services. Further, this proposal would eliminate the teachers'
bargaining advantage of pressuring the school board by striking with-
out incurring the usual economic harm. In short, the non-stoppage
strike would provide a bargaining tactic equivalent to a public sector
strike.
In a graduated strike situation, the "employees would stop working
during portions of their usual work week and would suffer compara-
ble reductions of wages."' 3 ° As its name suggests, the work-halt
could be increased in stages, when additional pressure is needed.
This technique would pressure both parties to settle, but the "de-
crease in public service would not be as sudden or complete as in the
conventional strike."'' Although this proposal would not be as
palatable to the public in the teacher-school board context as would
the non-stoppage strike, it still provides a valuable alternative. Par-
ties could use this procedure when the non-stoppage strike fails to
127. This theory is persuasively presented in Bernstein, supra note 42, at 470-74.
128. Id. at 470.
129. Id. at 471-73.
130. Id. at 470.
131. Id.
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produce a settlement or in situations where the history of the particu-
lar teacher association and school board indicate a need for a
stronger bargaining tool.
Both the non-stoppage and graduated strike proposals would give
teacher unions sufficient leverage to ensure effective collective bar-
gaining but would also prevent any debilitating interruption of public
services. 132
The devices, which could also work in tandem,133 appear to be rel-
atively easy to implement as well as politically acceptable. Further,
because these proposals are specifically tailored to some of the pecu-
liarities of public sector labor relations, the non-stoppage and gradu-
ated strike proposals promise to operate effectively.
V. CONCLUSION
It is possible to give teachers and other public employees a right to
strike-a right which teachers currently exercise in defiance of both
legislative mandate and the general integrity of the law-and still
protect the public welfare. The teachers' union would have sufficient
leverage at the bargaining table to force the government-employer to
negotiate, but this pressure would not occur at public expense. Addi-
tionally, according public employees the right to strike could substan-
tially reduce the incidence of public school teacher strikes since the
strike threat itself should sufficiently pressure the school board to ne-
gotiate equitably. Compared to the ineffective and circuitous routes
of typical strike substitute statutes, a statutory grant to teachers of the
right to strike would be a direct and effective means of avoiding
school closings and producing collectively negotiated settlements
which embody the needs of both parties. Such a change would
prompt negotiations between co-equal parties and would effectuate
true collective bargaining.
132. Id. at 470-74.
133. Id. at 470.
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